Cynthia Driver v. Utah Department of Health : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Cynthia Driver v. Utah Department of Health :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jean P. Hendrickson; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Michael E. Bulson; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Cynthia Driver v. Utah Department of Health, No. 20001072 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3028
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CYNTHIA DRIVER, ) 
Petitioner and Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ] 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE ] 
FINANCING, ; 
Respondent and Appellee. ] 
\ Case No. 20001072-CA 
I Priority No. 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Final Agency Order of October 4,2000, by which the Director of 
the Division of Health Care Financing, Utah Department of Health, adopted the 
Recommended Decision of the hearing officer to deny coverage under the Utah 
Medical Assistance Program. 
Michael E. Bulson #0486 Jean P. Hendrickson #4986 
Utah Legal Services, Inc. Assistant Attorney General 
893-24th Street Mark L. Shurtleff #4666 
Ogden, Utah 84401 Attorney General 
515 East 100 South 
Attorney for Appellant Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0835 
Attorneys for Appellee 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
uJPLED 
w»n Court of Appeals 
JUN 2 1 2001 
PauJetteStagg 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CYNTHIA DRIVER, ] 
Petitioner and Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ] 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE ] 
FINANCING, ; 
Respondent and Appellee. ] 
} Case No. 20001072-CA 
l Priority No. 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Final Agency Order of October 4,2000, by which the Director of 
the Division of Health Care Financing, Utah Department of Health, adopted the 
Recommended Decision of the hearing officer to deny coverage under the Utah 
Medical Assistance Program. 
Michael E. Bulson #0486 Jean P. Hendrickson #4986 
Utah Legal Services, Inc. Assistant Attorney General 
893-24th Street Mark L. Shurtleff #4666 
Ogden, Utah 84401 Attorney General 
515 East 100 South 
Attorney for Appellant Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0835 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
a. Issues 1 
1. Whether the services provided to Cynthia Driver were 
services excluded from coverage under the UMAP 
rules 1 
2. Whether the Department of Health properly exercised 
the discretion delegated by the Legislature when it 
adopted UMAP rules and standards and, whether the 
Division of Health Care Financing [DHCF] correctly 
interpreted or applied the rules when it denied UMAP 
coverage 2 
3. Whether DHCF's decision to deny UMAP coverage 
complied with the uniform operation of laws provision 2 
b. Standard of review 2 
Issue 1: Where an issue involves the determination of 
facts, made or implied by the agency, the 
agency's findings cannot be upset by a 
reviewing court if the findings are supported by 
substantial evidence based on the record as a 
whole 2 
i 
Issue 2: Where an issue raises the question of whether 
an agency's actions were within the grant of 
authority conferred by the governing statute, 
this presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness; a question of interpretation or 
application of a statute is reviewed under 
varying standards from correctness to abuse 
of discretion 2 
Issue 3: An agency's determination challenged as 
unconstitutional presents a question of general 
law which is reviewed under a correction of 
error standard 3 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 4 
a. Constitutional provisions 4 
b. Statutory provisions 4 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-10. Utah Medical 
Assistance Program - Policies and standards 4 
c. Administrative rules 5 
1. Utah Admin. Code R420-1 -5. Service 
Coverage 5 
2. Utah Admin. Code R420-1-6. Limitations and 
Excluded Services 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
a. Nature of the case 6 
b. Course of proceedings 6 
c. Disposition below 7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 7 
ii 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 10 
A. Service coverage limits 10 
B. Authorized exercise of authority 10 
C. No violation of uniform operation of laws provision 11 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. THE UTAH MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS A 
PROGRAM OF LIMITED COVERAGE; PROGRAM RULES 
DESCRIBE COVERED CONDITIONS AND SERVICES AS 
WELL AS LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUDED SERVICES 11 
II. THE LEGISLATURE DELEGATED DISCRETION TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH TO ESTABLISH POLICIES, 
STANDARDS AND RULES NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT 
THE OPERATIONS OF UMAP 18 
A. Establishing service coverage and 
exclusions to coverage is within the grant 
of authority the Legislature gave the 
Department 18 
B. The Department's adoption of rules 
governing limitations and exclusion of 
coverage is analogous to pre-existing 
conditions clauses in health insurance 
policies 21 
III. THE DEPARTMENT'S CLASSIFICATION OF COVERED 
AND EXCLUDED SERVICES IS REASONABLY RELATED 
TO A LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST 23 
A. Laws must operate uniformly on all 
persons within a class 24 
iii 
B. The differences created by the 
classification must be rationally 
related to the objective of the statute 32 
CONCLUSION 33 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 35 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A (Determinative Statutes, Rules and 
Constitutional Provisions) 
Addendum B (Recommended Decision, Final Agency Order, 
Request for Reconsideration and Denial of Request 
for Reconsideration) 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) 25 
Cospito v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1984) 25 
McWilliams v. Capital Telecomms., Inc., 986 F.Supp. 920 (M.D. Pa. 1997) 22 
Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790 (10th Cir. 2001) 30 
Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 903 
(S.D. Ind. 1994), affd, 93 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1996) 22 
STATE CASES 
Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991) 3,20 
Bishop v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 545 P.2d 1125 (Kan. 1976) 22 
Chandler v. Department of Employment Sec, 678 P.2d 315 (Utah 1984) 24 
Deaconess Med. Ctr. of Billings, Inc. v. Department ofSoc. & Rehab. Servs., 
720 P.2d 1165 (Mont. 1986) 25 
Drake v. Industrial Comm 'n, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997) 3 
First Nat'I Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 
(Utah 1990) 2,12 
Greenwood v. City ofN. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816 (Utah 1991) 24 
Hansen v. Public Employees Ret. Sys., 246 P.2d 591 (Utah 1952) 31 
Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982) 24 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) 25,32 
N.R. v. State, 967 P.2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 25 
v 
Peterson v. Utah Dep 't of Health, 969 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 3 
Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 817 P.2d 316 (Utah 1991) 3 
R.O.A. Gen., Inc. v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 966 P.2d 840 (Utah 1998) 3 
SFPhosphate Ltd. Co. v. Auditing Div., 972 P.2d 384 (Utah 1998) 3 
Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div., 846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993) 20 
South Davis Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Department of Health, 869 P.2d 979 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) 3,19 
St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Twin Falls County, 732 P.2d 278 
(Idaho 1987) 28 
State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995) 25,32 
Utah Pub. Employees' Ass 'n v. State, 610 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1980) 23 
Zissi v. State Tax Comm 'n. 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992) 2 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24 2,4 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-55 (repealed 1987) 29 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-55.5 (repealed 1974) 29 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(2) 27 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-10 passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12 30 
vi 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) 1 
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
Utah Admin. Code R420-1-2 15,16 
Utah Admin. Code R420-1-5 passim 
Utah Admin. Code R420-1-6 passim 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Dan J. Tennenhouse, Attorneys Medical Deskbook § 5:3, at 5-199 (3d ed. 1993) 9 
vii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CYNTHIA DRIVER, ] 
Petitioner and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ) 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE ] 
FINANCING, ; 
Respondent and Appellee. ) 
) CaseNo.20001072-CA 
) Priority No. 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1997), "all final agency action[s] resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings" fall under the jurisdiction of either the Supreme 
Court or the Court of Appeals. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996), the Court 
of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
a. Issues: 
1. Whether the services provided to Cynthia Driver [Driver], Petitioner and 
Appellant, were services excluded under the rules governing the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program [UMAP]. 
2. Whether the Department of Health properly exercised the discretion 
delegated by statute when it established rules and standards needed in administering, 
developing and implementing the medical assistance program; and, whether the Division 
of Health Care Financing [DHCF] by denying UMAP coverage correctly interpreted or 
applied the administrative rules to the circumstances surrounding Driver's treatment at the 
hospital and her subsequent request for UMAP coverage of those services. 
3. Whether the Division of Health Care Financing complied with the 
constitutional requirement that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation," Utah Const, art. I, § 24, when it applied the rules of UMAP to Driver's 
situation and denied coverage for the treatment she received. 
b. Standard of review: 
Issue 1: Where an issue involves the determination of facts, made or 
implied by the agency, the agency's findings cannot be upset by a reviewing court if the 
findings are supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. Zissi v. 
State Tax Comm % 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). A petitioner challenging the agency's 
findings must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and then show, despite 
the supportive evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. First 
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. County Bd of Equalization, 199? 2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). 
Issue 2: Where an issue raises the question of whether an agency's actions 
were within the grant of authority conferred by the governing statute, this presents a 
2 
question of law reviewed for correctness. Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343, 349 
(Utah 1991). Alternatively, if Driver's argument is actually directed to DHCF's 
interpretation or application of statutes or rules, the standard of review under those 
conditions is as follows: If the issue raised questions the Department's construction of 
the UMAP statute, that presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. SF 
Phosphate Ltd. Co. v. Auditing Div.f 972 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1998). Regarding the 
Department's interpretation of its own rules, the Department's interpretation would be 
upheld so long as it is rational and reasonable. Id.; see also R.O.A. Gen., Inc. v. Utah 
Depft ofTransp., 966 P.2d 840 (Utah 1998) (deferring to the administrative agency's 
interpretation of its own rules so long as that interpretation is reasonable). An agency's 
application of law to an historical set of facts is reviewed for correctness; such a review 
will apply "varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review for 
'correctness' and a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 
939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted); see Peterson v. Utah Dep't of Health, 
969 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); cf. South Davis Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Department of 
Health, 869 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (finding that an agency expressly granted 
discretion by the legislature has its decisions reviewed for reasonableness and rationality). 
Issue 3: An agency's determination challenged as unconstitutional presents 
a question of general law which is reviewed under a correction of error standard. Questar 
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991). 
3 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of the following provisions is determinative of or of central 
importance to this Court's consideration of this appeal. 
a. Constitutional provisions: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24. (A copy of article I, section 24 appears in Addendum A.) 
b. Statutory provisions: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-10. Utah Medical Assistance Program -
Policies and standards. 
(1) The division shall develop a medical assistance program, which shall be 
known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program, for low income persons 
who are not eligible under the state plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of 
the Social Security Act or Medicare under Title XVIII of that act. 
( 2 ) . . . . 
(3) The department shall develop standards and administer policies relating 
to eligibility requirements . . . for participation in the program, and for 
payment of medical claims for eligible persons. 
(4) The program shall be a payor of last resort. Before assistance is rendered the 
division shall investigate the availability of the resources of the spouse, father, 
mother, and adult children of the person making application. 
(5) The department shall determine what medically necessary care or 
services are covered under the program, including duration of care, and 
method of payment which may be partial or in full. 
(6) The department shall not provide public assistance for medical, hospital, 
or other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible 
persons where the purpose of the assistance is for the performance of an 
4 
abortion, unless the life of the mother would be endangered if an abortion 
were not performed. 
(7) The department may establish rules to carry out the provisions of this 
section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-10 (1998 & Supp. 2000). (A copy of section 26-18-10 in its 
entirety appears in Addendum A.) 
c. Administrative rules: 
1. Utah Admin. Code R420-1-5. Service Coverage. 
(1) The scope of services covered by UMAP is limited to treatment of 
conditions that meet one or more of the following criteria, unless elsewhere 
excluded: 
(a) an acute condition characterized by a rapid onset requiring 
prompt medical attention. UMAP shall consider a condition 
to be not acute once it is medically established to have been in 
existence for four months or more, regardless of when the 
client began experiencing symptoms. Recurring conditions 
are not acute; 
(b) a life-threatening condition that is not psychiatric; 
(3) For all UMAP covered services, the principal diagnosis at discharge 
from the hospital is the reason for the care. UMAP may not consider the 
other diagnoses when determining whether the service is covered by 
UMAP. 
Utah Admin. Code R420-l-5(l) & (3) (1995). (A copy of rule R420-1-5 in its entirety 
appears in Addendum A.) 
2. Utah Admin. Code R420-1-6. Limitations and Excluded Services. 
(1) Conditions that are not covered by UMAP include: 
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(c) mental illness or disorder, drug addiction, alcohol addiction; 
(2) Services that are not covered by UMAP include: 
(e) psychiatry, or any service provided to a client while he is in a psychiatric 
facility, wing, ward, or bed; 
Utah Admin. Code R420-1-6(1) & (2) (1995). (A copy of rule R420-1-6 in its entirety 
appears in Addendum A.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case: 
This is an appeal from the agency's decision denying UMAP coverage for the 
emergency transportation and hospital services provided to Driver. The services provided 
were among those listed as excluded services under the UMAP operational rules. 
b. Course of proceedings: 
A Notice of Denial dated 21 April 2000 informed Driver that UMAP coverage for 
all services provided in connection with the hospital, physician and transportation 
services she received in connection with the event precipitated on 29 January 2000 was 
denied (R. at 14). On 5 May 2000 Driver requested a formal hearing of the denial (R. at 
12). An agency Prehearing to discuss the issues of the case was scheduled and then 
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conducted on 12 July 2000 (R. at 8). The formal hearing was conducted 30 August 2000 
(R. at 29). At the formal hearing conducted by Bert Jansen, Hearing Officer, Driver 
appeared personally and testified and was represented by her counsel. The Department's 
representative Cleve Evans, Health Program Manager for the UMAP program, appeared 
and gave testimony. Both sides submitted exhibits. Hearing Officer Jansen issued his 
Recommended Decision on 7 September 2000, affirming the agency's decision denying 
UMAP payment for services (R. at 40-43). The Final Agency Order, adopting the 
Recommended Decision, was mailed with a copy of the Recommended Decision to 
Driver on 4 October 2000 (R. at 45). Driver's request for reconsideration of the Final 
Agency Order, dated 19 October 2000 (R. at 47), was denied and the disposition dated 14 
November 2000 was mailed the same day (R. at 49-51). Driver filed her Petition for 
Review with this Court on 8 December 2000 (R. at 60). 
c. Disposition below: 
Driver's request for payment for services rendered in connection with her 29 
January 2000 hospitalization after she attempted suicide was denied by the UMAP 
program. That denial was affirmed after the formal hearing. The decision to deny 
payment was upheld after the agency denied reconsideration of the Final Agency Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cynthia Driver, described as a 36-year-old woman at the time of the events at issue 
in this appeal, had been approved for UMAP coverage effective 1 October 1998 (R. at 
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41). On 29 January 2000 she tried to commit suicide (R. at 20, 75-27). She was 
transported by ambulance to the hospital and treated in the McKay-Dee Hospital 
emergency room on 29 January 2000 (R. at 35). 
The physician's dictation described Driver's arrival at the emergency room. She 
had drunk alcohol and "overdos[ed] on 60 Lithobid and 25-30 Claritin tablets by history" 
(R. at 20). She was "noted to be quite angry" (Id.) and threatened "next time [she would] 
use [a] gun" (Id). During the agency hearing, Driver testified she had ingested 90 
Lithobid and approximately 15-20 allergy pills. She testified she "induced the effect with 
alcohol to get it going faster" (R. at 75-27). Driver claimed one of the reasons she 
attempted suicide was because she had been notified that she was being denied social 
security disability benefits (R. at 75-29). She stated she had attempted to commit suicide 
several times in the past, beginning at the age of fifteen (R. at 20, 75-29). Driver's 
response to questioning at the hospital established she had a lengthy psychiatric treatment 
history (R. at 20). At the agency hearing, Driver testified she had been in mental health 
treatment since September 1998 (R. at 75-28). Driver had received treatment for bipolar 
depression and drug therapy was prescribed. Numerous medications had been prescribed 
and used, including Lithobid, Klonopin, Flexeril, amitriptyline, Prozac, Ativan, 
Wellbutrin, trazodone, Xanax, and Librium (R. at 20-21, 75-28). 
The McKay-Dee Hospital Center History & Physical Report Psychiatric 
Assessment, administered 29 January 2000, by Dennis H. Smith, M.D., stated the 
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diagnosis was: "Bipolar affective disorder, not otherwise specified, currently appears 
mixed with depressive and manic symptomatology. Probable obsessive compulsive 
disorder. Panic disorder with agoraphobia. Dysthymic disorder. (Rule out chronic 
depression)" (R. at 22). During the assessment, Driver also reported lower back pain, 
recent chest pain which went up into her back, as well as various surgeries and procedures 
beginning in 1963. Dr. Smith also recorded that the "patient relates multiple stressors 
with regards that home, marriage, family, Social Security evaluation, mental health, etc. 
However, will not give specifics, seems more irritated with mental health than anything 
else, however, will not give specific details regarding this" (Id). 
At her request, Driver was discharged 31 January 2000 (R. at 18). The diagnosis 
upon discharge, prepared by Dr. Smith, indicated Driver had "Bipolar affective disorder 
NOS.1 Currently appears mixed with depressive and manic symptomatology. Probable 
obsessive compulsive disorder. Panic disorder with agoraphobia. Dysthymic disorder" 
(R. at 18). On the "Discharge Summary" under "Physical Findings" Dr. Smith recorded 
"[n]o significant acute problems during physical examination" (R. at 18). 
In response to a coverage request submitted to UMAP, on 21 April 2000 a "Notice 
of Denial - Utah Medical Assistance Program" was sent to Driver (R. at 14). The 
services denied were inpatient hospital, physician services and transportation, specifically 
'"NOS" is a standard medical abbreviation for "not otherwise specified." Dan J. 
Tennenhouse, Attorneys MedicalDeskbook § 5:3, at 5-199 (3d ed. 1993). 
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McKay-Dee Hospital 29 January 2000, Wasatch Emergency Physicians and Ogden Fire 
and Ambulance expenses (Id). The reasons for the denial were: 1) Services for any 
psychiatric conditions are not covered by UMAP; 2) the services were not within the 
scope of coverage — coverage is limited to conditions which are acute, infectious or life-
threatening; and 3) law enforcement involvement - UMAP will not provide payment for 
any surgical or medical need to those persons who are in the custody of law enforcement. 
. . at the time the services were rendered (Id.). (The latter reason was withdrawn at the 
prehearing held 12 July 2000) (R. at 41). A formal hearing took place 30 August 2000 
(R.at40). 
UMAP's decision to deny payment was affirmed after the administrative hearing 
(R. at 43). The request for reconsideration was denied on 14 November 2000. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Service coverage limits. UMAP is a state-funded medical assistance program 
having a limited scope of covered services. The services Driver received came within the 
exclusion of coverage definitions of the UMAP operational rules. Excluded services will 
be denied payment coverage. 
B. Authorized exercise of authority. The Legislature gave the Department the 
authority to establish rules and standards necessary to administer and implement the 
UMAP program. The Department was granted discretion by the Legislature to determine 
what medically necessary care or services would be covered services. The rules establish 
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a system of covered and excluded services. Under the provisions of the UMAP statute, 
the Division of Health Care Financing [DHCF] was authorized by the Legislature to 
develop the program. To accomplish this, DHCF may execute the rules in a manner 
determined to be effective and efficient. The program's operations are conducted in 
conformance with the rules adopted by the Department. 
C. No violation of uniform operation of laws provision, UMAP's decision to 
deny payment for the services Driver received in connection with her hospitalization was 
made in accordance with the rules. The program rules govern what medically necessary 
conditions and services are included within the program's service coverage. Classification 
is not per se impermissible. Classification reasonably related to a legitimate state interest 
is constitutional, notwithstanding it results in line-drawing. The agency's actions within 
the classifications are permissible so long as they are uniformly applied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS 
A PROGRAM OF LIMITED COVERAGE; PROGRAM 
RULES DESCRIBE COVERED CONDITIONS AND 
SERVICES AS WELL AS LIMITATIONS AND 
EXCLUDED SERVICES. 
Petitioner Cynthia Driver's initial claim asserts the hospital and related services 
she received should have been covered by UMAP and that the agency's decision denying 
coverage was not supported by substantial evidence. 
Having raised this claim, Driver "must marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
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findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the [agency's] findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence." First Nat'I Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). Driver has failed to marshal the 
evidence. 
A significant impediment to her ability to prove this point is that Driver failed to 
provide any significant evidence at the formal hearing concerning her health condition 
that was contrary to that presented by DHCF. Driver did not introduce any medical 
testimony from treating physicians. Other than a doctor's billing statement, no additional 
documentary evidence was produced to challenge or place in question the medical records 
previously made available to UMAP. 
Driver claims coverage should have been provided because of a life-threatening 
condition. What Driver fails to recognize is that not all life-threatening conditions are 
covered by UMAP. Rule R420-1-5 describes the scope of services covered. That scope 
is expressly "limited to treatment of conditions that meet one or more of the following 
criteria, unless elsewhere excluded." Utah Admin. Code R420-1-5(1) (1995) (emphasis 
added). Continuing on, R420-1-5 states that one criterion is "(b) a life-threatening 
condition that is not psychiatric." Among the express limitations and exclusions is "(c) 
mental illness or disorder, drug addiction, alcohol addiction." Utah Admin. Code R420-1-
6(l)(c)(1995). 
Driver's first argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
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UMAP's denial of coverage attempts to ignore the lack of her own evidence by focusing 
on certain portions of the statute, rules and definitions and constructing an analytical 
framework to suit her needs. This approach is ineffective for several reasons. 
First, Driver fails to fully acknowledge and consistently state the entire rule 
challenged. Admittedly, Driver does use the phrase, "excludes coverage for life-
threatening conditions when the principal diagnosis is 'psychiatric.'" Appellant's Br. at 
10. But the thrust of her argument appears in the repeated use of life-threatening 
condition alone to create the impression that "life-threatening" is the controlling element 
of the rule. By focusing attention on "life-threatening" without the qualifying language 
excluding psychiatric conditions, Driver attempts to refocus the attention to be paid to the 
facts relied upon by the hearing officer. Only if all life-threatening conditions were 
covered under UMAP would Driver be correct in showing that the evidence supported her 
position, notwithstanding the agency's findings. 
To achieve her conclusion that the services provided should have been covered 
because her condition was life-threatening, Driver must ignore the portion of the rule 
which excludes psychiatric conditions. She does this by claiming "her principal diagnosis 
shifted from a covered life-threatening condition to an uncovered psychiatric condition." 
Appellant's Br. at 11. This conclusion, however, ignores all the necessary steps followed 
by any program, be it UMAP or some private health or hospital insurance program, which 
requires application of coverage criteria to determine whether or not a claim will be paid. 
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Second, Driver misreads the statute delegating discretion to the Department to 
define the scope of the program. The statute creating the medical assistance program is 
short. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-10 (1998 & Supp. 2000). The Legislature delegated 
discretion to the Department to develop standards, policies and rules for program 
participation. Specifically, "[t]he department shall determine what medically necessary 
care or services are covered under the program...." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-10(5) 
(1998). "The department may establish rules to carry out the provisions of this section." 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-10(7) (1998). 
The critical language to note is that "the department shall determine what 
medically necessary care or services are covered under the program" (emphasis added). 
Applying the usual rules of grammar to this phrase makes it evident that "some" 
medically necessary care or services are not covered. It is not necessary, as Driver 
suggests in her brief, to focus a great deal of attention to the definitions of "medically 
necessary" and "life-threatening," Appellant's Br. at 9-10, to discover whether substantial 
evidence supports the agency's findings that coverage be denied. It is not contended that 
Driver did not need medical attention. But since the Department had discretion to 
determine what medically necessary services would be covered, some services would not 
be covered and the services to Driver fell within that category. 
Third, Driver juxtaposes statutes, rules and definitions to create the appearance the 
evidence was insufficient to support the agency's decision, but upon scrutiny this does 
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nothing to defeat the agency's findings. Driver attempts to place the agency's reliance on 
the program rules describing covered services and excluded services in question. 
Appellant's Br. at 10. But there is no reason to place less reliance on the coverage and 
exclusion rules (R420-1-5 and -6) than on the rules defining "medically necessary" and 
"life-threatening" (R420-1-2(9) and (7)). UMAP provides coverage for "medically 
necessary" care and services; this is not the same as stating UMAP covers all medically 
necessary care and services. It is a significant distinction and one that the statute and 
rules intend. The framework created by the medical assistance statute and the rules 
adopted to carry out the statutory provisions are reasonable and rational when read 
together. The definitions are not stand-alone provisions: they are read with the coverage 
and exclusion provisions and other sections of the rule for the Utah Medical Assistance 
Program. 
In Driver's second major argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, 
Driver attempts to divert attention from the lack of evidence supporting her position by 
arguing DHCF is guilty of a major failure in not acquiring the best medical information 
available for review. Appellant's Br. at 13. This alleged failure applies to the use of 
"discharge diagnosis" as the reason for care which in turn determines whether the service 
is a covered service or not. The definitions section of the rule states: "'Principal 
diagnosis at discharge' means the main medical problem- based on the best information 
available for review by UMAP" (R420-1-2(10)). Under the service coverage section of 
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the rule it states: "For all UMAP covered services, the principal diagnosis at discharge 
from the hospital is the reason for the care. UMAP may not consider the other diagnoses 
when determining whether the service is covered by UMAP" (R420-1-5(3)). The major 
failure Driver ascribes to DHCF is that, in Driver's view, the agency was required to 
independently seek out additional information concerning Driver's condition and 
treatment. Additionally, Driver contends DHCF should have questioned the physician's 
discharge diagnosis. Appellant's Br. at 11-13. 
This is a mistaken position and is based on an erroneous interpretation of the rule. 
The rule states: "'Principal diagnosis at discharge' means the main medical problem, 
based on the best information available for review by UMAP" (emphasis added) (R420-1-
2(10)). This rule does not require representatives from UMAP to independently go in 
search of and obtain information on a particular patient's condition and treatment. The 
rule requires that the best information available be reviewed. Evans testified that the 
coverage decision would be based on the medical records (R. at 75-6). Logically, the 
burden to supplement the medical records, if need be, rests on the UMAP client 
challenging the agency's decision. At the administrative hearing, Driver submitted one 
exhibit which was a billing statement for $240 from Dr. King (R. at 35, 75-33). Driver's 
testimony and evidence at the administrative hearing did not throw into doubt the 
physician's discharge diagnosis relied upon by DHCF. 
Driver has challenged the use of discharge diagnosis as the coverage criterion. 
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However, her argument has not discredited it as a reasonable tool. Even assuming, for 
purposes of this argument. UMAP should have used admission diagnosis, the evidence 
shows that Driver's assessed condition was essentially consistent from her arrival at the 
emergency room to her discharge. She arrived at the hospital with marked behaviors of 
mental distress. From the physician's dictation, he observed a woman who was 
"incredibly angry," who exhibited "[s]evere agitation," whose "mood appear[ed] 
depressed in one sense and hypomanic in another," who "admitted to hearing voices," and 
who exhibited "very rapid" speech and "significant psychomotor agitation during the 
interview" (R. at 21-23). Assessing her condition as primarily psychiatric at discharge is 
borne out from the initial contact with the patient. 
During the administrative hearing, hypothetical situations were posed and explored 
by Driver's counsel (R. at 75-8-11, -15 to 17). However, those exchanges between 
Driver's counsel and Evans, the UMAP program manager, did not add any evidence 
which would show that the agency's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. 
Indeed, the statements made by Evans were consistent with the decision UMAP made; 
i.e., the physician describes the patient's diagnoses and identifies treatment and UMAP 
reviews that information in making its coverage decisions. 
If additional information was available and relevant and should have been 
considered by DHCF, Driver should have submitted that information. There is no support 
for Driver's contention that the DHCF representative should have either challenged the 
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physician's discharge diagnosis or requested clarification of the diagnosis. Appellant's 
Br. at 13. Driver's claim that upon further inquiry and explanation by a DHCF employee 
the physician likely would have changed the discharge diagnosis, Appellant's Br. at 13, is 
highly questionable, for a variety of reasons. There was nothing presented at the 
administrative hearing to suggest the medical or psychiatric assessments prepared by the 
physician were inconsistent, ambiguous or otherwise questionable or unreliable. Absent 
some reason to question the physician's reports, the medical reports were the best 
information available for review by UMAP, Driver simply failed to provide evidence to 
contradict the available information. As a consequence, Driver is now impeded in her 
effort to marshal the evidence to prove that the findings supporting the agency decision 
are not supported by substantial evidence when viewing the record as a whole. 
H. THE LEGISLATURE DELEGATED DISCRETION TO 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH TO ESTABLISH 
POLICIES, STANDARDS AND RULES NECESSARY 
TO CARRY OUT THE OPERATIONS OF UMAP. 
A. Establishing service coverage and exclusions to coverage is within the 
grant of authority the Legislature gave the Department. 
The legislative scheme grants broad discretion to the Department and to the 
Division of Health Care Financing within that Department to establish and operate the 
state-funded medical assistance program. The statute creating the medical assistance 
program is clear and broad in its mandate that the Department act: the "department shall 
develop standards and administer policies relating to eligibility requirements . . . for 
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participation in the program...." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-10(3) (1998 & Supp. 2000) 
(amended 1999). In this particular instance, the statutory language expressly requires the 
Division to act: the "Division of Health Care Financing . . . shall be responsible for 
implementing, organizing, and maintaining the . . . Utah Medical Assistance Program 
established in Section 26-18-10...." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1998). The UMAP 
statute continues in this broad and expansive fashion stating "[t]he department shall 
determine what medically necessary care or services are covered under the program, 
including duration of care, and method of payment, which may be partial or in full." Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-18-10(5) (1998). To carry out the provisions of the Utah Medical 
Assistance Program statute, the department may establish rules. Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-
10(7) (1998). 
Thus, the Department and DHCF have broad authority to establish and implement 
the program. The court in South Davis Community Hospital Inc. v. Department of 
Health 869 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), held "that the legislature has, by virtue 
of section 26-18-2.3(1), explicitly granted DHCF discretion to establish criteria 
concerning Medicaid reimbursement." Given that the same section of the Medical 
Assistance Act creates DHCF's responsibility for UMAP as for the Medicaid program, a 
similar conclusion about the broad discretion granted to DHCF to establish UMAP 
criteria can be reached. 
In addition to this express grant of authority, the Department "has such implied 
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powers as are reasonably necessary to effectuate its express powers or duties." Bennion 
v. ANR Prod Co., 819 P.2d 343, 350 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). Under this 
analysis, the Department's adoption of service coverage and exclusion rules should be 
viewed as a reasonable exercise of its express and implied power to establish and 
implement the medical assistance program. "It is a long-standing principle of 
administrative law that an agency's rules must be consistent with its governing statutes." 
Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div., 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
In Sanders Brine Shrimp, the court decided that no statutory support existed for the 
Commission's definition of the term "manufacturer," nor was the Commission authorized 
to further limit the availability of the tax exemption as it had done. Here, however, the 
express legislative grant of power to the Department is broad and requires the Department 
to develop standards and policies of eligibility and scope and duration of services 
covered. This breadth of power necessarily implies the Department must describe and 
define the program and has broad discretion to do so. The rules adopted are in harmony 
with the statute. The statute grants the authority to "determine what medically necessary 
care or services are covered" within the confines of a limited medical assistance program. 
Driver's emphasis on denial of coverage for services because of her attempted 
suicide obscures the nature of the coverage and exclusions rules. In fact, Driver's 
statement of the issue of "[wjhether DHCF exceeded its authority under the UMAP 
statute by adopting a rule which excludes coverage for self-inflicted injuries caused by a 
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psychiatric condition," Appellant's Br. at 1, is a misstatement of the rule which misdirects 
proper analysis. UMAP does not have any specific rule that excludes coverage for self-
inflicted injuries. 
The Legislature gave the Department broad authority to establish a program of 
limited coverage for individuals not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare. Utah Code Ann. 
§26-18-10(1) (1998). Given that the program is limited and that the Department is 
authorized to determine what medically necessary services are covered, it was a 
reasonable exercise of discretion to exclude any services connected with psychiatric 
conditions or services, without regard to any other criteria. Under this scheme, it is 
reasonable to assume that the limited program will concentrate limited resources to the 
specified covered services. The program rules adopted by the Department identify at the 
outset what conditions and services the limited funds can be projected to cover. 
Conscientious fiscal planning must anticipate the medical needs the UMAP program 
covers. Coverage and exclusion decisions are made in conformance with the existing 
rules, not in response to subsequent funding issues, as Driver alleges. 
B. The Department's adoption of rules governing limitations and 
exclusion of coverage is analogous to pre-existing conditions clauses in 
health insurance policies. 
The scheme of medical coverage under UMAP can be analogized to many health 
care and insurance programs which exclude coverage for pre-existing conditions. As the 
cases point out, the pre-existing condition clause can take many forms. They may be 
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limited by time, previous treatment, conditions with manifested symptoms, or even with 
respect to any pre-existing condition. McWilliams v. Capital Telecomms., Inc., 986 F. 
Supp. 920 (M.D. Pa. 1997); Pitcher v. Principal Mut Life Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 903, 907 
(S.D. Ind. 1994), affd, 93 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1996). Cases arise from challenges to 
definitions or terms of treatment or similar policy language for pre-existing conditions. 
Because the specific policy provisions are different in each case and each case concerns a 
specific person's situation, the decisions do not follow in a particular line. Pitcher, 870 F. 
Supp. at 908. But this is not the important point. The important point is that courts 
recognize coverage exclusions exist and the exclusions can be broad. This result appears 
in the court's decision in Bishop v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 545 P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Kan. 
1976). Upon release from the hospital, Bishop submitted a claim based on total disability 
due to coronary heart disease. The benefits policy at issue excluded coverage for any 
disability resulting from a disease or illness existing prior to the effective date of the 
policy. The court noted Bishop had an extensive history of heart disease documented 
several years prior to the effective date of the insurance policy. Based upon the evidence 
establishing the prior existence of the heart problems, the court found the schedule of 
exclusions under the policy precluded coverage for Bishop's policy claim. Id; see also 
McWilliams, 986 F. Supp. at 927-28 (pre-existing condition clause precludes medical and 
short-term disability coverage for thyroid cancer treatment). 
Just as in Bishop and McWilliams, the exclusion in Driver's case is not based on 
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the severity of the condition or symptoms; it is based on the classification of condition 
falling within the program exclusions. In the case of UMAP, all psychiatric conditions, 
services or treatments are excluded, without reference to self-inflicted conditions or 
symptoms expressing the psychiatric disorder. 
UMAP is a limited medical assistance program intended to exclude some 
conditions from its coverage. Under "Service Coverage" in Rule R420-l-5(l)(a) (1995), 
it provides that, notwithstanding an acute condition requiring prompt medical attention, 
coverage will not be provided if the condition has "been in existence for four months or 
more, regardless of when the client began experiencing symptoms. Recurring conditions 
are not acute." Upon analyzing the effect of this rule, Driver must accept that some 
conditions are excluded, even some conditions "requiring prompt medical attention." 
III. THE DEPARTMENT'S CLASSIFICATION OF 
COVERED AND EXCLUDED SERVICES IS 
REASONABLY RELATED TO A LEGITIMATE 
STATE INTEREST. 
Under the reasonable basis test applicable to this challenge, the restrictions placed 
on services to be covered under UMAP are rational in light of the objectives of the 
program and the other community resources available for mental health treatment. Cases 
relying upon the equal protection clause apply a reasonableness analysis. In Utah Public 
Employees'Ass'nv. State, 610P.2d 1272, 1273-74 (Utah 1980), the court found the 
governor's policy restricting all Division of Wildlife Resources employees from 
participating in big game hunting permit programs reasonably related to a legitimate state 
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purpose, thus not a violation of the employees' equal protection rights. In Liedtke v. 
Schettler, 649 P.2d 80, 81 (Utah 1982), the court found the classifications created in the 
small claims statute to be constitutional. Liedtke had challenged the different treatment 
applied to plaintiffs which made the judgment of the small claims court conclusive upon 
the plaintiff. Allowing defendants the right to appeal recognized the plaintiffs right to 
choose the forum and did not deny equal protection to the plaintiff. 
When a regulatory scheme is challenged as unconstitutional, reviewing courts will 
uphold the regulations when the resulting classification is rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest. See Chandler v. Department of Employment Sec, 678 P.2d 315,317-18 
(Utah 1984) (recognizing the Legislature's need to deal with social and economic 
problems affecting people and groups differently and being able to create rational 
classifications). In a case where no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, if the 
classification is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest, the courts will generally 
uphold the statute or rule as constitutional. See Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 
817 P.2d 816, 820-821 (Utah 1991). 
In the present case, Driver has challenged the DHCF's application of regulations 
as unconstitutional under Utah's constitutional provision requiring uniform application of 
general laws. 
A. Laws must operate uniformly on all persons within a class. 
Driver's constitutional challenge is not a facial challenge of the UMAP statute. 
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Driver claims the rules adopted by the Department to implement the Utah Medical 
Assistance Program unconstitutionally denied service coverage to her because of her 
discharge diagnosis from the hospital. In her challenge to the denial of coverage under 
UMAP, Driver recognizes the burden she bears and the high hurdle she must clear to 
establish the denial was unconstitutional. As she admits in her brief, Appellant's Br. at 
17, health care is not a fundamental right which would require strict scrutiny of the state's 
actions.2 Additionally, mental illness or disability is not a suspect classification. N.R. v. 
State, 967 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing and quoting City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) for support); Cospito v. Heckler, 742 
F.2d72, 83(3rdCir. 1984). 
Nevertheless, having acted and created the UMAP program, similarly situated 
individuals must be treated similarly by DHCF in the operation of UMAP. See Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984); State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997-98 (Utah 1995). 
One of Driver's arguments rests on her contention that a discharge diagnosis 
dictated by the attending physician results in arbitrary treatment of UMAP clients. Driver 
2The Utah Constitution does not provide a constitutional guarantee of medical 
assistance for medically needy. For comparison, Montana's Constitution provides: "The 
legislature shall provide such economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services 
as may be necessary for those inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmity, or misfortune 
may have need for the aid of society." The Montana Legislature enacted a statute 
establishing a county medical assistance program. Thus, in Deaconess Medical Center of 
Billings, Inc. v. Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services, 720 P.2d 1165 (Mont. 
1986), the court found the county obligated to provide medical assistance to the needy 
who were not covered by Montana's Medicaid program. 
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argues that using "discharge diagnosis" as a coverage criterion is per se arbitrary. The 
hospital physician attending Driver dictated his discharge diagnoses and stated that 
Driver's principal condition was "bipolar affective disorder not otherwise specified." 
This diagnosis was elaborated upon in the physician's psychiatric assessment contained in 
the hospital history (R. at 20). It is Driver's contention that a physician unfamiliar with 
UMAP coverage and exclusion rules could, and in her case did, describe the discharge 
diagnosis in conformance with his medical experience and training and thereby state a 
particular and principal discharge diagnosis which falls into an excluded category of 
coverage. There is no good reason proposed that someone other than the attending 
physician is in a better position to describe a patient's condition and diagnosis. 
Driver fails to explain why a physician's discharge diagnosis is suspect and not reliable as 
a useful coverage criterion. 
Using discharge diagnosis as a coverage criterion is reasonable and rational. 
After the physician has assessed the patient's condition, and he or she can make an 
accurate statement of diagnosis, the medical records would contain reliable information 
about the patient's condition. Inasmuch as the UMAP statute defines the program as a 
limited one and such determination shall fall to the Department as it decides what 
conditions shall be covered, reliance on a medical diagnosis as a coverage criterion is a 
reasonable means to achieve that objective. Much of Driver's disagreement with the 
physician's decisions seems to have little to do with either the diagnosis or admittance as 
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an inpatient and the care and treatment she received but rather on the fact that ultimately 
her diagnosis was an excluded condition under UMAP. Since the physician's diagnosis 
was consistent with Driver's own testimony (R. at 75-28), and a reasonable basis exists 
for discharge diagnosis serving as a coverage criterion, Driver cannot prevail on this 
point. 
Next, Driver argues that because UMAP includes coverage for some acute or life-
threatening conditions, simply because she arrived at the emergency room after a suicide 
attempt she should be treated no differently than someone arriving as a result of an 
automobile collision. This position is only possible if the program rules are interpreted to 
provide coverage for all life-threatening or acute conditions. The rule expressly states 
coverage is available for "a life-threatening condition that is not psychiatric." Similarly, 
conditions which have been in existence for four months or more are not acute and thus 
are not covered. Driver seeks support for her position by referencing section 26-18-10(6) 
which prohibits public assistance for the performance of an abortion "unless the life of 
the mother would be endangered." Appellant's Br. at 22. This provision simply 
evidences the Legislature's persistent rejection of the use of public funds for abortion. 
This language is essentially duplicated in the section referencing standards for eligibility 
under the Medicaid program. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-4(2) (1998 & Supp. 2000) for 
equivalent language in the Medicaid program statute. It is reasonable to assume the 
Legislature was aware of the prohibition against abortion services expressed in the 
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Medicaid section of the Medical Assistance Act and intended the same prohibition to 
apply under UMAP, making it clear that no public-funded program would provide such 
services. The Legislature made a conscious decision to reference that specific medical 
condition and delegated the balance of the program's coverage to the Department's 
determination through rules. Excluding certain services and conditions is consistent with 
the UMAP statute requiring the Department to determine what medically necessary care 
or services are covered under the program. As previously discussed, this statute does not 
mandate that all medically necessary care or services shall be covered. 
Another of Driver's arguments poses the idea that the program impermissibly 
denies coverage in instances of self-inflicted injury. Driver relies on an Idaho decision in 
which medical indigency assistance was initially denied to a person after an unsuccessful 
suicide attempt. St. Alphonsus Reg'I Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Twin Falls County, 732 P.2d 278 
(Idaho 1987). On appeal the court found that Idaho's medical indigency law required 
county medical assistance for individuals hospitalized for medical services and to allow 
compensation to hospitals providing indigent care; there was no exclusion for self-
inflicted wounds. The court's decision was based on the broad language of the medical 
indigency statutes enacted "'to provide suitable facilities and provisions for the care and 
hospitalization of persons in this state, and, in the case of indigent persons, to provide for 
the payment thereof . . . ' I.C. § 31-3501 (1983)." Id. at 280. This language is broad 
28 
and the county's stated denial based on self-inflicted injuries was contrary to the 
legislative intent. 
Utah's care of its medically indigent and dependent poor also was once the duty of 
counties. Section 17-5-55:5, Utah Code Ann. (1953), required counties to pay a minimum 
sum into a central fund to pay for hospital and medical care for the state's medically 
indigent. When that section was repealed in 1974 (repealed by 1974 Utah Laws ch. 24, § 
2), the counties were relieved of the funding obligation for medically needy and the state 
assumed exclusive responsibility for funding. The change in funding also gave the state 
authority to determine the scope of coverage and the extent of payment. Finally, section 
17-5-55, Utah Code Ann. (1953) (amended 1981), also was repealed (repealed by 1987 
Utah Laws ch. 181, § 5), removing the obligation that counties financially participate in 
programs providing medical care to indigents. 
Utah's statutes no longer have a broad medical indigent provision such as that 
referenced in St. Alphonsus. Utah statutes provide for medical assistance under the 
Medicaid program. For those low-income individuals not eligible under Medicaid, the 
state-funded UMAP program offers limited service coverage. The broad medically 
indigent statute referenced in St. Alphonsus differs from the UMAP statute. The UMAP 
statute gives broad discretion to the Department to establish a medical assistance program 
and to determine the scope of that program. 
On the surface, St. Alphonsus and Driver's situations appear similar. But on close 
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examination, the differences are significant. The analysis used in St. Alphonsus cannot be 
applied to Driver's case. Idaho's medical indigent statute does not describe service 
coverage and exclusions as are described in UMAP. Utah's UMAP program could be 
compared more to an intermediate step between Medicaid for the truly medically needy 
and an employer-paid insurance benefit plan for its employees. Even if someone has no 
insurance, hospitals with emergency departments must provide emergency care to any 
patient who comes to its emergency department. Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr.f 244 F.3d 
790, 796 (10th Cir. 2001) (deciding, inter alia, application of Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) and finding hospital's compliance with the 
requirements of the act). Additionally, mental health programs are provided through local 
mental health authorities as described in Chapter 12 of Title 62A of the Utah Code. 
Indeed, UMAP is a limited program, but it is not the only program available to people of 
limited financial means, as in Driver's case, who need other services not provided by 
UMAP. 
Coverage for Driver was not denied because she tried to commit suicide. 
Coverage was denied because UMAP excludes coverage for all psychiatric conditions 
and services. UMAP is not an assistance program equivalent to the situation described in 
St. Alphonsus; rather it is a program of limited service coverage for low-income 
individuals not eligible for Medicaid. 
Another point made by Driver asserts that a lack of uniformity in operation of the 
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program is established by the hypothetical situations presented at the administrative 
hearing. Some of Evans' responses at the hearing did appear to place doubt upon the 
regulatory scheme. However, upon careful reading of the transcript (R. at 75-15 to 22), 
Evans remained consistent in his final explanation of the application of the rules (R. at 
75-42 to 43). If services are provided, and the principal diagnosis at discharge is within 
the scope of coverage, UMAP will cover the treatment. If the services provided are 
among the exclusions, UMAP will not cover the treatment. Driver cannot prove her case 
by pointing to hypothetical situations. As posed, the hypothetical situations ignored some 
relevant factors. For example, discharge diagnosis must be acknowledged as a factor. 
Also, the conclusions stated by Evans in response to the hypotheticals were that 
psychiatric conditions would not be covered. The hypothetical situations did not occur 
and are not facts. They are Driver's argument in support of her position. 
Applying the exclusions provision in this case is not arbitrary. It is the logical 
result of line-drawing in the coverage of services. No matter where lines are drawn, 
someone will be on the other side of the line and the results of that may be harsh. That 
does not equate with a system which is so arbitrary as to violate the equal protections 
provided for under the constitution. See Hansen v. Public Employees Ret. Sys., 246 P.2d 
591, 597-98 (Utah 1952) (liquidating the state retirement system required classification of 
employees based on years of service and while those just below the line viewed the line 
drawing as arbitrary and unreasonable it was nevertheless constitutional). Nor does the 
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line-drawing applied to UMAP clients treat persons within the class, individuals 
diagnosed with psychiatric disorders, different from each other. See Malan, 693 P.2d at 
670; Mo/*/, 901 P.2d at 997. 
B. The differences created by the classification must be rationally related to the 
objective of the statute. 
Driver contends that UMAP regulations have no rational basis as a cost-saving 
measure. Appellant's Br. at 21. As has been repeatedly stated, UMAP is a limited 
service coverage program. The cost-containment measures were incorporated into the 
program at the outset. By determining what medically necessary care or services would 
be covered services, UMAP could focus its limited resources towards those discrete 
services. Denial of coverage for services is not made after-the-fact because of funding 
constraints. Denial of coverage decisions are based on the existing rules which are in 
place prior to a UMAP client's receipt of services. While the results of the rules applied 
to Driver's case may appear harsh, certain facts must be remembered. UMAP is a limited 
medical assistance program. The Legislature has already recognized and provided for 
medically needy persons who are without sufficient resources to pay for medical 
necessities; this is the intent of the Medicaid program. Individuals eligible for UMAP are 
not eligible for Medicaid. Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-10(1) (1998). UMAP fills some of 
the gap of medical needs. Under UMAP, the low-income individual is relieved of some 
of the financial burden for her own care but not all of it. Having the burden lightened on 
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some needs permits use of her own resources for medical care and services which are 
excluded from UMAP coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
This denial of medical coverage is an instance of line-drawing. Some might call it 
arbitrary, but in reality all line-drawing will impact someone contrary to his or her desires, 
and in application line-drawing may in fact have harsh results. Line-drawing, whether or 
not harsh results follow, is not per se arbitrary. Nevertheless, some classifications are 
essential. In the case of UMAP, the line was drawn to exclude all psychiatric conditions 
and services from coverage. 
Ultimately, Driver is in a situation where she indeed required emergency medical 
attention. However, the UMAP program is not a full-coverage program. Its covered 
services are limited and even for those it does cover the coverage may be partial. Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-18-10(5) (1998). Driver acknowledges UMAP is a limited medical 
assistance program. She has not shown that the Department, in adopting the rules 
governing UMAP operations, acted beyond the broad grant of authority it has received 
from the Legislature. She has not shown why discharge diagnosis, adopted by the 
Department in rules as a coverage criterion, is inherently unreliable as a means to 
determine what services provided should be covered. She has not shown why the 
attending physician is not in the best position to describe the patient's diagnoses. She has, 
in fact, testified of receiving long term treatment for bipolar affective disorder just as the 
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physician dictated in his psychiatric assessment (R. at 20). 
Driver cannot prevail on any of her theories. The decision of the agency denying 
UMAP coverage based upon a coverage exclusion should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 3tl V day of June , 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
Jean P. Hendnckson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent and Appellee 
Utah Department of Health 
34 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the Sl/sf day of June , 2001,1 caused 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to be served by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid, on each of the following: 
Michael E. Bulson 
Utah Legal Services, Inc. 
893-24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Petitioner and Appellant Cynthia Driver 
DATED this Si S/day of June , 2001. 
£* 
Jean P. Hendrickson 




26-18-4 UTAH HEALTH CODE 68 
(3) Subsection (2) does not prevent the division from contracting with other 
health care delivery organizations if the division determines that it is advan-
tageous to do so. 
(4) Health care delivery systems that meet the requirements of this section 
may provide all services otherwise available under the state plan for medical 
assistance, except prescribed drugs. 
(5) The division shall periodically report to the Health and Human Services 
Interim Committee regarding the development and implementation of the 
amendment to the state's freedom of choice waiver required under this section. 
History: C. 1963, 26-18-3.7, enacted by L. stylistic change in Subsection (l)(c) and substi-
1993, ch. 57, § 1; 1994, ch. 314, § 2; 1996, ch. tuted "Health and Human Services Interim 
250, § 1; 1997, ch. 209, § 1; 2000, ch. 1, § 45. Committee" for "Legislative Health and Envi-
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend- ronment and Human Services Interim Commit-
ment, effective May 1, 2000, made a minor teesr in Subsection (5). 
26-18-4. Department standards for eligibility under Med-
icaid — Funds for abortions. 
(1) The department may develop standards and administer policies relating 
to eligibility under the Medicaid program as long as they are consistent with 
Subsection 26-18-3(6). An applicant receiving Medicaid assistance may be 
limited to particular types of care or services or to payment of part or all costs 
of care determined to be medically necessary. 
(2) The department shall not provide any funds for medical, hospital, or 
other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible persons 
where the purpose of the assistance is to perform an abortion, unless the Kfe 
of the mother would be endangered if an abortion were not performed. 
(3) Any employee of the department who authorizes payment for an abor-
tion contrary to the provisions of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
and subject to forfeiture of office. 
(4) Any person or organization that, under the guise of other medical 
treatment, provides an abortion under auspices of the Medicaid program is 
guilty of a third degree felony and subject to forfeiture of license to practice 
medicine or authority to provide medical services and treatment. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-4, enacted by L. ment, effective May 3, 1999, inserted "as long 
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1987, ch. 181, § 2; 1999, as they are consistent with Subsection 26-18-
ch. 61, § 3. 3(6)" in Subsection (1). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
26-18-10. Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies 
and standards. 
(1) The division shall develop a medical assistance program, which shall be 
known as the Utah Medical Assistance Program, for low income persons who 
are not eligible under the state plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act or Medicare under Title XVIII of that act. 
(2) Persons in the custody of prisons, jails, halfway houses, and other 
nonmedical government institutions are not eligible for services provided 
under this section. 
(3) The department shall develop standards and administer policies relat-
ing to eligibility requirements, consistent with Subsection 26-18-3(6), for 
participation in the program, and for payment of medical claims for eligible 
persons. 
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(4) The program shall be a payor of last resort. Before assistance is rendered 
the division shall investigate the availability of the resources of the spouse, 
father, mother, and adult children of the person making application. 
(5) The department shall determine what medically necessary care or 
services are covered under the program, including duration of care, and 
method of payment, which may be partial or in full. 
(6) The department shall not provide public assistance for medical, hospital, 
or other medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible persons 
where the purpose of the assistance is for the performance of an abortion, 
unless the life of the mother would be endangered if an abortion were not 
performed. 
(7) The department may establish rules to carry out the provisions of this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 26-18-10, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
1982, ch. 26, § 1; 1985, ch. 165, § 38; 1987, ment, effective May 3, 1999, inserted "consis-
ch. 181, § 3; 1988, ch. 21, § 9; 1999, ch. 61, tent with Subsection 26-18-3(6)" in Subsection 
§ 4. (3). 
CHAPTER 19 
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT 
26-19-4.5. Assignment of rights to benefits. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Status of assignor. 
An assignment to the state of third party 
payments made by a disabled minor's natural 
father was valid and effective under this sec-





This section does not violate 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(a)(l), which prohibits liens against 
Medicaid recipient's property on account of 
medical assistance received, as payments made 
custody of the child, as this section creates an 
assignment upon a recipient's acceptance of 
Medicaid payments and the father was statu-
torily responsible for the minor's medical ex-
penses. S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998). 
by third parties do not become the property of 
the recipient until after a valid settlement 
which must include reimbursement to the state 
for Medicaid benefits. Wallace v. Estate of Jack-
son, 972 P.2d 446 (Utah 1998), cert, denied, — 
U.S. —, 120 S. Ct. 42, 145 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1999). 
Cited in S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 
1998). 
26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third party 
— Lien — Notice — Action — Compromise or 
waiver — Recipient's right to action protected. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
UTADCR420-1 
UA.C.R420-1 
Utah Admin. R 420-1 
Pagel 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
HEALTH 
R420. HEALTH, HEALTH CARE FINANCLNG, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. 
Current through February 1, 2001 
R420-1 Utah Medical Assistance Program. 
R420-1-1. Introduction and Authority. 
(1) The Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP) is designed to provide medically necessary care to low income 
clients who are not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare. 
(2) This rule is authorized under Section 26-18-10. 
R420-1-2. Definitions. 
Terms used in this rule are defined in R414-1, except that "client" shall have the meaning defined below In addition: 
(1) "Chronic condition" means a condition characterized by its long duration or recurrence. 
(2) "Client" means a person who has completed a current form MI-13 and been approved for UMAP eligibility 
(3) "Crime" means any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction, of which an individual is eventually convicted. Crimes also 
mclude those to which an individual pleads guilty or no contest, or those to which an individual enters into a diversion 
agreement as outlined in sections 77-2-5 through 77-2-9 UCA. 
(4) "Emergency service" means a medical service performed to treat a condition that, m the absence of immediate 
medical attention, could reasonably be expected to result in death or permanent disability to the client. Immediate 
medical attention is treatment given within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms or within 24 hours of diagnosis 
(5) "Emergency transportation" means an an or ground ambulance required to transport a client in need of an 
emergency service. UMAP shall not reimburse for emergency transportation services if a client could have been safely 
transported by a less costly method of transportation. 
(6) "In custody" means being detained or held under guard by law enforcement personnel at the scene of a crime or in 
a detention facility, until unconditionally released, or released on probation or parole. The Department shall consider a 
resident of a jail, correctional facility, or half-way house to be in custody. 
(7) "Life threatening condition" means a medical condition which, if not immediately treated, poses an imminent 
danger to life or will result m permanent disability. Disabihty is the limiting loss or absence of the capacity to perform 
activities of daily living or occupational demands. Permanent disability occurs when the degree of loss of this capacity 
becomes static or well-stabilized, and is not likely to improve despite continuing medical or rehabilitative measures. 
(8) "Medically indigent" is abbreviated "MI", which is a prefix for UMAP form numbers. 
(a) MI-13 is a UMAP form that explains to clients the rights and responsibilities they have as UMAP clients. A MI-13 
form is current from the time it is completed until there is a break in eligibility of more than six consecutive months. 
(b) MI-706 is a UMAP form entitled "UMAP Reimbursement Agreement" that authorizes reimbursement for a 
medical service. 
(9) "Medically necessary" means reasonably calculated to prevent, diagnose, or cine conditions that endanger life, 
cause suffering and pain, cause physical deformity or malfunction, or threaten to cause a handicap, and there is no other 
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equally effective course of treatment available or suitable for the client requesting the service that is more conservative 
or less costly 
(10) "Principal diagnosis at discharge" means the mam medical problem, based on the best information available for 
review by UMAP. 
R420-1-3. Client Eligibility Requirements. 
(1) To be eligible for UMAP services, clients must meet the catena in R414- 309. These criteria can be viewed at the 
UMAP administrative office located at 288 N 1460 W , Salt Lake City, Utah, or at any site where the Department of 
Workforce Services or the Department of Health determines eligibility for clients. 
(2) Before a client can receive services from UMAP, he must have a specific medical need that is within the UMAP 
scope of services and meets all other UMAP criteria. 
R420-1-4. Program Access Requirements. 
(1) UMAP has three medical climes Each clinic has on its staff a physician, or a physician assistant or nurse 
pracntioner workmg under the supervision of a physician. For clients who reside m Salt Lake, Weber, Morgan, and 
Utah counties, if the physician or supervising physician determines it appropriate, the physician, physician assistant, or 
nurse practitioner shall evaluate and treat the client. 
(2) The clinic may refer the client outside of the clinic only for treatment of covered conditions that cannot be treated 
in the clinic. The supervising physician shall decide the conditions that can be treated at the clinic. The clinic manager 
shall decide the services that are covered under UMAP 
(3) Clients residmg m all other counties may contact the nearest Office of Workforce Services for a form MI-706. This 
office may then refer the client to a private physician who is willing to treat the client within the guidelines of UMAP 
criteria 
R420-1-5. Service Coverage. 
(1) The scope of services covered by UMAP is limited to treatment of conditions that meet one or more of the 
following criteria, unless elsewhere excluded. 
(a) an acute condition characterized by a rapid onset requiring prompt medical attention UMAP shall not consider a 
condition to be acute once it is medically established to have been m existence for four months or more, regardless of 
when the client began experiencing symptoms Recurring conditions are not acute; 
(b) a life-threatening condition that is not psychiatric; 
(c) a communicable disease that poses a health nsk to the general public; 
(d) a condition that will result m irreversible blindness if left untreated, blindness meaning no better than 20/200 visual 
acuity in the better eye after correction. 
(e) cataracts, if the correction is no better than 20/60 visual acuity m the better eye. 
(f) eyeglasses for a client m a work or training program if the client cannot participate m the work or training without 
the eyeglasses, or for a diabetic client who cannot see well enough to administer his own medication. 
(2) UMAP may cover the following medical services: 
(a) outpatient hospital services; 
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(b) physician services, 
(c) midwife and birthing center services. 
(d) radiology and lab services. 
(e) emergency transportation services for both air and ground, 
(f) dental services; 
(g) pharmacy services, 
(h) rural health services; 
(1) home health services for IV antibiotics. 
(3) For all UMAP covered services, the principal diagnosis at discharge from the hospital is the reason for the care. 
UMAP may not consider the other diagnoses when determining whether the service is covered by UMAP. 
(a) UMAP shall pay a fixed tnage fee for emergency transportation, emergency room physicians, and emergency room 
facility charges for services that do not result in an inpatient admission, if the admission diagnosis is a UMAP covered 
medical condition, but the principal diagnosis at discharge is psychiatric 
(b) The fixed tnage fee shall constitute payment for the entire service. A notation on the form MI-706 advises the 
provider that he received authorization for only the minimal set tnage fee 
(4) A provider or a client may resolve questions about coverage of a specific condition or service by contacting the 
appropnate UMAP clinic m Salt Lake, Morgan, Weber, or Utah counties, or the Office of Workforce Services for all 
other counties, dependmg upon where the client lives. 
R420-1-6. Limitations and Excluded Services. 
(1) Conditions that are not covered by UMAP include: 
(a) chrome pain, back pain, knee pam, joint pam, from recurring or chronic conditions, 
(b) hennas that are not strangulated or incarcerated, carpal tunnel syndrome, bunions, nasal polyps, 
(c) mental illness or disorder, drug addiction, alcohol addiction, 
(d) obesity, hormonal imbalance, bulimia, anorexia nervosa, 
(e) long-standing arthntis, except treatment of acute flare-ups is a covered service; 
(f) allergies, cataracts, temporomandibular jomt dysfunction, premenstrual syndrome, aseptic (avascular) necrosis; 
(g) rhinitis, 24-hour gastntis, common cold, any condition for which there is no accepted medical therapy; 
(h) a condition that is disabling, but does not meet the cntena listed m R420-l-5(l), 
(l) a condition that is not covered by the Utah Medicaid program; 
(j) a condition caused because of a snow skiing or snowboarding accident, 
(k) a condition caused when the client was committing a crime. UMAP shall allow the client to present information to 
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prove that mvoivement m the alleged crane did not cause or contnbute to his medical condition. The client must submit 
this informanon within 60 days of the date of the denial; 
(1) a condition caused when the client was bemg arrested; 
(m) a condition caused when the client was injured by a law enforcement officer; 
(n) a condition caused when the client was m custody; 
(0) a condition that results from experimental or recreational use of drugs or chemicals, (with the exception of drinking 
distilled spints, wme, or malt beverages, and smoking or chewing tobacco). UMAP considers use to be experimental or 
recreational if, on his own initiative, an individual uses: 
(I) prescnption drugs m a manner that is contrary to the physician's instructions for their use; 
(n) non-prescnption drugs or chemicals m a manner that is contrary to package instructions, e.g., sniffing glue or other 
substances, drinking rubbing alcohol, laxative abuse; 
(in) illegal drugs, e.g., a drug or controlled substance, the use of which is a violation of state or federal law. 
(p) UMAP determines use by an evaluation of the best available medical evidence regarding the condition. 
(q) UMAP allows clients to present mformation to prove that experimental or recreational use of drugs or chemicals 
did not cause or contnbute to the medical condition. Clients must submit this mformation within 60 days of the date of 
demal. 
(2) Services that are not covered by UMAP mclude: 
(a) cosmetic surgery; 
(b) tympanoplasties; 
(c) hysterectomies and pelvic surgery, except when there is a reasonable suspicion of a life threatening condition; 
(d) back surgenes, knee surgenes, jomt surgenes, for recurring or chrome conditions; 
(e) psychiatry, or any service provided to a client while he is m a psychiatnc facility, wing, ward, or bed, 
(f) diagnostic work, unless a covered condition is suspected; 
(g) speech pathology, audiology (except to rule out a brain tumor), audiometry (except to rule out a brain stem lesion); 
(h) medical supplies, except syringes, lancets, test stnps for diabetics, and ostomy supplies; 
(1) medical equipment, except an oxygen concentrator if required 24 hours a day; 
(j) prosthetic devices, except once when the need for the device anses from any authorized surgery; 
(k) care m a long-term care facility, physical therapy, rehabilitative services, chiropractic services, 
(1) dental work (except for exam, x-ray, and extraction of infected teeth), dentures; 
(m) stenlization (tubal ligation, vasectomy, etc.), abortion (unless the life of the mother would be endangered if an 
abortion were not performed), birth control; 
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(n) elective surgery, organ transplants, 
(0) liver biopsy or use of Interferon when being prescnbed for treatment of Hepatitis C, 
(p) treatment m a pain clinic, 
(q) non-emergency use of an emergency room or emergency transportation; 
(r) a service that is not covered by the Utah Medicaid program, 
(s) a service if the department determines that there is or was an effective less-costly alternative; 
(t) a service provided to treat a medical condition, if the need for treatment arose while the client was in custody; 
(u) a service for a condition that is a complication of, or a follow-up service for, a non-covered UMAP service. The 
only exception would be if the service was not covered as a result of lack of client eligibility; 
(v) medication that is prescnbed for the treatment of hypercholesterolemia, 
(w) D4K anti-ulcer PPIs, 
(x) hormones that are prescnbed for the treatment of female hypogonadism. 
R420-1-7. Form MI-706. 
(1) UMAP may only pay for a service authorized on a form MI-706. The client must obtain the form MI-706 before 
the service is provided. The client may obtain the form MI-706 after the service is provided if the service is within 
UMAP scope of services, meets all other UMAP cntena, and* 
(a) is a follow-up service for a surgery that UMAP has authorized. Follow-up services are for normal, uncomplicated 
post-surgery hospitalization, office follow-ups, or other services provided within six weeks of the surgery and directly 
related to the surgery; or 
(b) is an emergency service; or 
(c) is a service that was provided before UMAP approved the client for eligibility, and before the client had completed 
a current form MI-13. The client must request the form MI-706 no later than one year after the date of service, or the 
date UMAP approved his eligibility, whichever is later The client shall provide any documentation that UMAP 
requires, or the client wants considered, to make scope-of-service decisions. 
(2) A client must present the form MI-706 to the provider before receivmg any service, except for situations m which 
there is no UMAP requirement for the client to obtain the form MI-706 pnor to receivmg the service If a client presents 
a form MI-706 to a provider before receivmg a service, and the provider accepts the form MI-706, the provider may not 
hold the client financially liable for the service that was provided, whether or not UMAP reimburses the provider. If a 
client does not present a form MI-706 to a provider, or if the provider does not accept the form MI-706, the provider 
may hold the client financially liable for the service and treat the client as a "self-pay" patient. Any tune a provider 
receives a form MI-706, and bills UMAP using the MI-706 number, UMAP shall consider that the provider has 
accepted the form MI-706. 
(3) After a client has completed a current form MI-13 and is approved for UMAP eligibility, he must present a form 
MI-706 to the provider for all non- emergency services before the services are provided. 
R420-1-8. Claims. 
(1) A provider shall submit a claim for UMAP services m the same way he submits a bill for Utah Medicaid services, 
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except the provider must submit a form MI-706 number for UMAP services If UMAP has authorized a service, a form 
MI-706 number will be printed on top ot the form MI-706 The provider shall enter this number in the appropnate box 
on the invoice The provider shall submit the claim no later than 12 months after the date of service or six months after 
the form MI-706 was issued, whichever is later 
(2) If a provider timely submits a claim and the claim is denied because there is no form MI-706, the provider may 
resubmit the claim to UMAP no later than one year after the date of service or two months after the date of demal, 
whichever is later The provider shall include with the resubmitted claim a copy of the remittance advice showing the 
denial, and documentation explaining the nature of the medical care provided 
R420-1-9. Reimbursement. 
UMAP shall only reimburse Utah Medicaid providers who accept payment from UMAP as payment m full for the 
service provided UMAP adopts the Utah Medicaid reimbursement policies and payment rates for services covered by 
UMAP, with the following exceptions 
(1) outpatient services, and ambulatory surgical center services shall be reimbursed at the Medicaid rate, minus 10%, 
(2) physician services, osteopathic services, and services provided by Federally Qualified Health Centers shall be 
reimbursed at the Medicaid rate minus 10%, 
(3) a client is required to pay a $2 co-pay for each UMAP covered pharmacy item (those billed usmg a NDC code) 
each time the item is dispensed or purchased 
Because inpatient hospital services are not a benefit of UMAP, UMAP shall not reimburse for these services 
R420-1-10. Third Party Liability, 
(1) UMAP may not reimburse for covered medical services if payment for the service can be, or could have been, 
obtained from other third-party sources If partial payment is made by a third-party payor, UMAP shall pay the 
difference up to the limits set by Medicaid 
(2) Clients and providers shall disclose potentially liable third parties When any other coverage is available (such as 
treatment at the Veterans Administration Hospital), the UMAP clinic or provider shall refer the client there for 
treatment, and UMAP may not authorize payment for those services 
(3) Clients who are potentially eligible for services through the Ryan White Title II Aids Drug Assistance Program 
(ADAP) must apply for, and follow through with their application for ADAP UMAP shall not pay if the client fails to 
cooperate m obtaining benefits through that program. 
R420-1-11. Client Rights and Responsibilities. 
(1) The client shall make an appointment to see office or clinic staff 
(2) If a client misses an appomtment m a UMAP clinic, the client shall have two options regarding future 
appointments The client may come m as a walk-in and wait to be seen on a first-come-first-served basis after clients 
who have appointments, or the client may make a co-payment before bemg seen at his next appomtment The co-
payment is $1 for missmg one appomtment, $2 for missmg two consecutive appointments, and $3 for missmg three 
consecutive appointments If the client misses more than three consecutive appointments, the client must come m as a 
walk-in and wait to be seen on a first-come- first-served basis after clients who have appointments Clients may cancel 
UMAP clinic appointments up to two hours before the appomtment with no penalty 
(3) If a client misses an appomtment with a private provider, the client shall make a $5 co-payment to UMAP for each 
of the client's next two appointments with private providers before the client will be given a form MI- 706 for these 
appointments If the client keeps these appointments, UMAP will refund the $5 as soon as the client returns to UMAP 
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and UMAP venfies that the client kept the appointment. UMAP shall consider appointments with pnvate providers to 
be missed if the client cancels the appointment less tftan 24 hours before the appointment. 
(4) UMAP may deny services to a client who verbally or physically abuses a member of the UMAP staff. 
(5) UMAP shall send a Notice of Denial to a client who is demed coverage for a requested medical treatment. If a 
client or a provider is aggneved by any action or inaction of the department, the person aggneved may request a hearing 
in accordance with R410-14 A provider does not have standing to contest issues concerning scope of services or the 
client's eligibility status. 
(6) The client shall be responsible for making a timely request for a form MI-706. If he fails to obtain the form 
MI-706, the client shall be liable for any costs incurred. 
KEY: indigent, medicaid, UMAP 
January 23, 2001 26-1-5 
Notice of Continuation July 21,1997 26-18-10 
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DEC! A R 4 TION OF RIGHTS 
project did not unconstitutionally grant bene-
fits to private individuals; any benefits were 
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-
mination of urban blight, Iribe v. bait 
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 {Utah 1975). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 
§§ 9 to 23. 
36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises 
K*>1. Vuriibvrs 
Franchises § 26. 
r rinchi>es «=» 11. 
Sec- 24. [Uniform operation ,i -iv^ _ 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
History: Const, 1896 
Cross-References. Prohibition on. pri 
vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
26. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Age of majority. 
Agent for service of process. 
Automobile license law. 
Construction with Art. VI, § 26. 
Contract carrier permit. 






Disparate tax assessments. 
Excess revenue refunds. 
Guest statutes. 
Inheritance Tax Law. 
Insurance premium tax exemption. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Licenses. 
Massage parlor ordinance. 
Municipal employment prerequisites. 
Notice requirements 
Property. 
—Responsibility for water service. 
Public employees' retirement system. 
Public officers' bonds. 
Public officers' salaries. 
Road poll tax. 
School activities. 
Search warrants. 
Sunday closing laws. 
Tax sales. 
Unfair .Practices Act. 
In general. 
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever 
uniform laws can be enacted. State v 
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563. 200 P. 894, 26 A L.R 
696 (1921). 
Objects and purposes of law present touch-
stone for determining proper and improper 
classifications. State v Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 
P.2d 920,. 11.7 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. & 
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 
(1941). 
One who assails legislative classification as 
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such. 
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Classification is never unreasonable or arbi-
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features so 
long as there is some basis for differentiation 
between classes or subject matters included as 
compared to those excluded, provided differen-
tiation bears reasonable relation to purposes : f 
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,, Inc 100 I Itah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Before legislative enactment can be inter-
fered with, court must be able to say that there 
is no fair reason for the law that would not 
require equally its extension to those which it 
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Only where some persons or transactions ex-
cluded from operation of law are, as to the sub-
ject matter of the law, in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary 
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis 
to differentiate can be found, law must be held 
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas-
sification does not render statute unconstitu-
tional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 
Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
In determining whether classification made 
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimina-
tion is very essence of classification and is not 
objectionable unless founded upon unreason-
able distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948). 
An act is never unconstitutional because of 
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Pursuant to Rule R410-14 of the Utah Administrative Code (Utah Health Depai tment) 
and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Section 63-46b-l, et seq., I Jtah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, a formal administrative hearing for the above captioned case was held on the 
30th day of August, 2000, at the Cannon Health Building, 288 North 1460 West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, The Petitioner, Cynthia Driver, appeared and was represented by Michael Bulson, 
Attorney at Law, with Utah Legal Services. The Respondent was represented by Cleve Evans, 
Program Manager for the Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP), 
ISSUE 
DID int. MEuii^Ai. AUH-NC V (UMAP) CORRECTLY DENY PAYMENT FOR 
SERVICES RECEIVED AT McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL BECAUSE (a) PETITIONER'S, 
CONDITION FOR WHICH SHE RECEIVED TREATMENT WAS PSYCHIATRIC IN 
NATURE, AND/OR (b) THE CONDITION WAS NOT ACUTE, LIFE THREATENING 
OR A COMMUNICABLE DISEASE. 
••k. Petitioner, L ynthia ; t - u VL.U oid ie *male who was admitted to McKay-Dee 
M; January 29, 2C00, as the result of a suicide aaem.pt. On that date she states that she 
J0 tablets of Lithium, 300 milligrams; 15 allergy tablets and an 'unspecified amount of 
>: She claims this attempt was prompted by her receiving notice that her claim for social 
. .. 't\ disability benefits had been denied. She claims that she had prior suicide attempts, the 
.est at age 17. She has been treated for mental illness off and on since September, 1998. She 
hVharged on January 31, 2000. 
While at the hospital she was observed, medicated and given an EKG. The principal 
diagnosis was *' Bipolar Affective Disorder NOS. Currently appears mixed with depression and 
maniac (sic) symptomatology. Probable obsessive compulsive disorder. Panic disorder with 
agoraphobia. Dysthymic disorder." She further complained of low back pain and stress. 
On April 21, 2000, a Notice of Denial was sent to the Petitioner. The Notice of Denial 
specified as reasons for denial (a) UMAP does not cover psychiatric conditions or treatment, (b) 
Not within scope of service - UMAP coverage is limited to conditions that are acute, life 
threatening or infectious and (c) Law enforcement involvement. UMAP will not authorize 
payment for any medical or surgical need which was provided to a person who was in the 
custody of a law enforcement officer, a jail or correctional facility at the time the service was 
rendered. At the pre-hearing reason (c) was determined not to be valid and was withdrawn by 
the Department of Health UMAP Program Manager. A timely Request for Hearing was filed, 
dated May 5, 2000, and received by the Utah Department of Health. A pre-hearing was held July 
12, 2000, and a formal hearing was requested at that time. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner is a 37 year old female who has suffered with psychological problems and 
suicide ideology since she was 17. 
2. Petitioner had been denied social security disability benefits and this prompted the 
January 29, 2000, suicide attempt. 
3. Petitioner had been approved for UMAP coverage effective October 1, 1998, and said 
coverage was effective on the date she sought treatment at McKay-Dee Hospital. 
4. That on April 29, 2000. she was admitted to McKay-Dee Hospital as the result of a 
suicide attempt in which she overdosed on 90 Lithium tablets, 15 allergy tablets and an 
unspecified amount of alcohol. 
5. The principal diagnosis determined by her treating physician was bipolar affective 
disorder, a psychiatric condition. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The medical agency properly denied payment for services because the requested 
services were for a psychiatric condition and were, therefore, a non-covered service as 
determined by Utah Administrative Code Rule R420-1-5 (1) (b) and Rule R420-1-6 (1) (c). 
2. The medical agency properly denied payment for services because the UMAP 
program specifically excludes services for mental illness or disorder as specified in Utah 
Administrative Rule R420-1-6 (1) (c). 
REASONS i * iR JILAKII'M i t )1T1( TRX ' DFf 1SION 
i he undisputed facts are mat me Petitioner sought medical assistance from the McKay-
Dee Hospital on January 2°. 2 ^ ^ w the rv^uit of a suicide attempt. The principal diagnosis 
specified in the discharge summar> is bipolar affective disorder, a psychiatric condition. I, Jtah 
Administrative Code Rule R42V-I-5 * 3*i states as follows 
-
;
 . -.'i an < *i.-u; J,'\<.TCL; ^-:-;uci. ^ pimeipai diagnosis at discharge from the hosj: ital 
> the reason lor care. UMAP may not consider tne other diagnoses when determining 
»vhciher the service is covered by UMA.: .•innasis added.) 
T Ttah Administrative Code Rule i ,-~^ . «^.r~ ..~ 
UMA ,r; states -r -un as follows: 
. The scope of services covered by UMAP is limited to ti eatment of conditions that 
meet one or more of the following criteria, unless elsewhere excluded: 
(a) an acute condition characterized by a rapid onset requiring prompt medical 
attention. UMAP shall consider a condition to be not acute once it is medically 
established to have been in existence for four months or more, regardless of w1 : 
the client began experiencing symptoms. Recurring conditions are not acute; 
(b) a life-threatening condition that is not psychiatric .:..:.p;:^:; • ;* A.; ) 
• * - . the centra! ^ublie...... 
.J .. * ~ i:;e position of the Petitioner that she comes within trc eo\ erage of the IJM, AP 
:;•- reeause her condition was life threatening at the time she entered the hospital, it is clear 
from ihe provisions of R420-! -5 < 1) ibj that even if the condition was life threatening it was a 
psychiatric conditio*-, nat - ^c: i: rlv ^-vK:,v i. 
Utah Administrative Code Rule R420-1-6 deals with those services that are specifically 
_.™_ ... * under the UMA P program. It reads in part as .follows: 
11! Conditions that are not covered by UMAP include: 
(c) mental illness or disorder, drug addiction, alcohol addiction..... (Emphasis 
• uidnl I 
12) Services that are not covered by UMAP include: 
Ce) psychiatry, or any service provided while (s)he is in a psychiatnc facility, 
'.viiir,, ward or bed,, , , 
Clearly, from the above language, the treatment of any metal illness or disorder or and 
service provided while being treated for such an illness is not covered under the UMAP proyiiini 
and Petitioner is not entitled to have these expenses paid by I, JMAP. 
. , itself were not covered, 
criteria must be met: 
it in an inpatient admission, ana, 
,. Those charges must be for services that do^o, resu ^ ^
 b u t m e 
was adduced at the hearing to tnd.cate thathe adm.ss.on 
service. Thus Counsel's argument must tail. 
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION 
above matter is AFFIRMED. No farmer agency action 
RIGHT TO REVIEW 
,v„llv reviewed by the Department of 
TOs Recommended Decision will he >»%?$£?** * » ^commended Dec.s.on 
Health, Division of Health Care Financingpno » «£*>
 rev iew> ^ te released 
L a Final Agency Action. which represents * - U ^ ^ j ^ 
simultaneously by the Department of Health, uiv 
Dated mis _J^L * y of September, 2000 
Case ^00-172-42 
EXHIBITS 
i lii 11 i l u u i i i g J o c w i i i ' i i l •< >\\.'w i J m i i f " ) iiifr i ' ,<wn<.i: 
Petitioner's Exhibit "1", Statement from Dr. David R. King, M.D. 
Respondent's Exhibit " *•" Rules 420-1-5 and 6. 
ischarge summary for Petitioner's visit to McKay Dee Hospital on 
0. 
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I I I AHDEP; ! 1 1 1 1 vlENT OF HEALTH 
DP TSION OF HEALTH C \RT" H \ A \ 
Respondent. 
F INAL AGENCY ORDER 
Case No. 00-172-42 
,i i OU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A 
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOUJ I) 
LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A PETITION IN THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS 
SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A 
RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOI JI I AY DO SO IF YOI J WISH m T wA V P 
QUESTION C W I (801)538 6576 
ITie enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 
Utah Code Ami, 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Procedure," and Department 
of Health Administrative Rule R410-14, entitled "Division of Health Care Financing 
Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/l JMAP Applicants, Recipients, and 
Providers" 
I he i eby adopt Recommended Decision No. 00-172-42 in its entirety, 
RKiHT i n Minn JAI Rf*Villi W 
% ithin twenty (20) days after the date that this final Agency Order is issued, you may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the Director of the Division of Health Care 
Financing. Any request for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial 
review. 
\ii review may be secured by filling a petition in the Utah Court: of Appeals within thirtj 
(30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency i Action or, if a request for reconsideration is 
A • , for reconsideration. The petition shall 
DATED this dav of October 2000 
ry\f. *' ' i i^ i 
Michael Deily, Director 
DWision of Health Care Fma^mg 
UTAH DEP ARTMENT OF^HEALTH 
2 
^M A—X 
| W W 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
893 24th Street, Ogden,Utah 84401 
Phone/Fax (801) 394-9431 
Toll Free 1 -800-662-2538 
H, I. I.J L ) ^ I ' ,, I I ! M I 
Michael Deil ly 
Director 
Division of Health Oar*r • g 
Utah Department of Health 
p.o. Box 4:; I 
Salt Lake Civ TTtah °^1!4-3:01 
Re: C * 
Dear Mr. Deillyi 
^
; r
 is tc request review of the undated final agency order in 
dse, wh;^n was mailed from your office on October 4, 200C. 
i'or tae following reasons, the decision should be reconsi^^^ --•• ? 
a decision made that the services are covered by UMAP. 
While the principal diagnosis determined by the emergency rocn 
physician was bipolar affective disorder, that is not the condition 
£ or which services were provided. Ms. Driver was taken to McKay 
i--- Hospital because of an attempted suicide. At the emergency 
~oom, the treatment provided was not for bipolar disorder but for 
1 i fe-threate n i n g i: o n d i t i o i 1 - attempted s u i c i d e. This Is' 
significantly different from, the hypothetical case of a UMAP 
patient who goes to a psychiatrist and is treated for bipolar 
disorder with medication and psychotherapy, To treat t-hp rasps t-hpi 
~~jie is illogical and inappropriate. 
Further, Ms. Driver is being discriminated against, simply 
because of the nature of her conditior Mr. Cleve Evans, who 
testified at the hearing, admitted that a claimant admitted to an 
.-.'niergency room with apparent cardiac symptoms would be covered, 
even though the symptoms might have been caused by a panic 
disorder, a r.ype of mental impairment. There is no rational basis 
ah Lake City ftmo Price Cedar City MonUceilo 
* 4th S.t 2nd Hi 45} N University 0100 23 S Carbon 01 I A South 200 West • 48 S. Main #1 i i n o o n I ^ i i - / < i 
.ctojber 19, 2000 
Paae 2 
for distinguishing such a case from what happened in Ms, Driver's 
case. Refusal to cover Ms. Driver represents a denial of equal 
protection under born the Utah and United States constitutions. 
Ms. Driver. 
I recognize that limited funds in the UMAP budget have forced 
severe restriction of services. However, even within those 
limitations, people must be treated fairly. It is wrong to exalt 
form over substance by classifying Ms. Driver's case as one 
involving a psychiatric condition and, therefore, ineligible. The 
Constitution was adopted to prevent such unfairness and I encourage 
you to reconsider this unfortunate decision. 
Very truly yours, 
lichael E. Bulson 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake City Provo Price Cedar City MonUcello 
is* w 4th S.. 2nd Fir. 455 N. University MOO 23 5. Carbon Ml 216 South 200 West 148 5. Mam #2 
*->AK>7M 637-2295 586-2571 587-3266 
7.800-662-1772 
CYNTHIA DRIVER. ) 
Petitioner, ) DENIAL OF REQUEST 
) FOR RECONSIDERATION 
vs. ) 
) 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH ) Case No. 00-172-42 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, ) 
Respondent. ) 
The petitioner's request for reconsideration has been reviewed pursuant to 63-46b-13 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION 
The petitioner's request for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 
REASONS FOR THE DISPOSITION 
As explained in the recommended decision, UMAP will not cover treatment of a patient 
when the principal diagnosis is psychiatric or mental illness. It does not matter whether there 
were other diagnoses along with the principal diagnosis. Petitioner does not allege any new 
facts, but rather, reasserts what Petitioner already argued during the hearing, that the diagnosis 
and treatment for the emergency medical condition resulting from the suicide attempt should be 
distinguished from the principal psychiatric diagnosis and treatment Petitioner received while at 
the hospital. A final agency decision has been appropriately made on this issue. Reasserting it 
again is not grounds for granting a reconsideration. 
Petitioner also asserts as grounds for reconsideration, that UMAP violates constitutional 
equal protection principles because UMAP witness Cleve Evans stated that UMAP would cover 
emergency cardiac symptoms caused by a panic disorder, yet, will not cover the treatment of 
Petitioner's suicide attempt resulting from a bi-polar condition. This brief statement does not 
signify that UMAP has equal protection problems when read in the context of UMAP 
requirements. As discussed in the final agency order, UMAP requires that the principal diagnosis 
will determine whether or not UMAP covers hospital care. If a panic disorder precipitates 
cardiac symptoms and the principal diagnosis is a medical condition such as an underlying heart 
problem or cardiac arrest, it would be covered by UMAP. If a panic disorder creates cardiac 
symptoms that require some medical attention, such as medication to alleviate the symptoms, yet 
the principal diagnoses and treatment ends up being a psychiatric condition, the treatment would 
not be covered by UMAP. In the present case, the principal diagnosis of Petitioner's suicide 
attempt was her underlying problem with her bi-polar psychiatric condition. Although, the 
emergency room resolved the emergency medical condition resulting from Petitioner's bi-polar 
induced actions, the primary problem and focus was the Petitioner's psychiatric condition. Thus, 
during the Petitioner's 2 to 3 day stay in the hospital, the hospital chiefly addressed Petitioner's 
principal bi-polar psychiatric condition. The fact there are at times consequences to psychiatric 
conditions that require emergency care, does not override the principal diagnosis of the 
psychiatric condition. Petitioner's assertion of an equal protection issue based on a brief and 
general statement of a UMAP witness, does not create an equal protection issue. Especially, 
when Petitioner ignores UMAP's principal diagnoses requirements as explained in the final 
agency order. Accordingly, reconsideration is not warranted here. 
Finally, Petitioner commented on recent funding cuts to UMAP and seems to imply that 
budgetary constraints may have played a roll in the decision to deny Petitioner coverage for her 
hospital treatment. This case involved both the treatment of a medical condition and a 
psychiatric condition. The hospital records indicate that the principal diagnosis and treatment of 
Petitioner was for her psychiatric condition. Although, Petitioner presented herself to the 
hospital because of putting herself into a life threatening condition, the hospital quickly stabilized 
the emergency medical condition and then focused on what the hospital noted as the principal 
condition, the Petitioner's psychiatric problems. As determined in the final order, UMAP denied 
coverage based on the hospital records indicating a principal psychiatric condition. UMAP has 
always been a program that is very limited in its scope of coverage. Speculating and implying 
that UMAP inappropriately denied Petitioner coverage based on budgetary concerns does not 
warrant reconsideration of this matter. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within 
thirty days of the issuance of this Response to Request for Reconsideration. The petition shall be 
served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon 
which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit shall 
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal this Response to Request for Reconsideration. 
A copy of this Response to Request for Reconsideration shall be sent to the petitioner or 
his/her representative at the last known address by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
DATED this J$J&y of November, 2000. 
Michael J. Deibf, Dirarfor 
Division of Health O&tz Financing 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
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